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Introduction
Three recent cases, all decided between June and September 2015,
show that luxury brand owners have developed a new strategy for limiting
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counterfeits: they bring lawsuits against individuals responsible for manu-
facturing and selling counterfeit goods.1  The defendants in all three cases
sold counterfeit versions of the plaintiffs’ products on the Internet, includ-
ing “Gucci” wallets, “Bottega Veneta” handbags, and other luxury brands’
jewelry, wallets, and handbags.2  These cases discuss the issue of whether
nonparty foreign banks could be compelled, under U.S. federal civil proce-
dure rules, to produce bank account information of individuals accused to
have engaged in counterfeit activities.3  Although the three cases share
almost identical facts, in 2011, three Southern District of New York judges
released differing opinions on this issue.4
In Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew,5 the court held that before asking the
court to issue a federal subpoena under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
Rule 45 (“FRCP 45”), plaintiffs should first request information located in
China through the Hague Convention.6  The court noted that plaintiffs may
renew their applications to enforce a federal subpoena if such a process
proved futile.7
On the other hand, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li (“Gucci I”),8
the court ordered the nonparty, Bank of China (“BOC”), to produce docu-
ments located in China pursuant to FRCP 45, reasoning that a Hague Con-
vention request through the Chinese government would not be a “viable
alternative.”9
In another similar case initiated by Tiffany, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v.
Forbse,10 the court diverged from two previous cases and ruled that the
BOC would be required to produce documents through the preliminary
injunction order’s discovery provision, while the two other Chinese banks
could produce documents through a Hague Convention request.11
1. See Minning Yu, Note, Benefit of the Doubt: Obstacles to Discovery in Claims
Against Chinese Counterfeiters, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2987, 2996– 97 (2013).
2. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
3. Megan C. Chang & Terry E. Chang, Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy:
Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 425, 425 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 160– 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 45; Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
7. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. at 160– 61.  The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, to which the
U.S. is also a party, was signed by the People’s Republic of China in 1991 and ratified in
1992. See Status Table, 14: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIVATE INT’L L. (Oct.13, 2015), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.sta
tus&cid=17.
8. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci I), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97814 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
9. Id. at *27, *38.
10. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976 (NRB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72148 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012).
11. Id. at *39.
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Nonparty BOC appealed both decisions in Gucci I and Forbse.12  On
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gucci America, Inc. v. Bank
of China (“Gucci II”) remanded both cases.13  The court reasoned that
because the decisions in Gucci I, Forbse, and Qi Andrew were decided based
on a presumption that was later overruled in Daimler AG v. Bauman,14 the
district court should reconsider whether it could exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over nonparty foreign banks based on the activities of the
banks’ in-state branches.15
On remand, the district court in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li
(“Gucci III”)16 held that because New York’s long-arm statute provides a
statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction and the exercise of such
specific personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process
and principles of comity, the court could exercise specific personal juris-
diction over BOC.17  BOC was then compelled to produce the requested
documents pursuant to FRCP 45, including those located at the BOC’s
headquarters in China.18
Gucci III exemplifies one way district courts approach personal juris-
diction issues over a nonparty foreign bank in the post-Daimler era.19
Given the case implications and the party involved, the decision will
expectedly attract media attention and inspire discussion among practi-
tioners.20  The Gucci case highlights the uneasy relationship between non-
party discovery and personal jurisdiction.  Although the Supreme Court
has yet to address whether U.S. courts have specific jurisdiction over non-
12. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir.
2014).
13. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. China Merchants Bank, 589 Fed. Appx. 550, 551 (2d Cir.
2014); Gucci II, 768 F.3d at 145.
14. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759– 60 (2014) (holding that a foreign
corporation may not be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction solely based on the
contacts of its in-state subsidiary).
15. Gucci II, 768 F.3d at 145.
16. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci III), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 135 F. Supp. 3d
87 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).
17. Id. at 96, 101, 104.
18. Id. at 104.
19. On remand, plaintiff Tiffany in both cases moved to default judgment, which left
the issue regarding specific personal jurisdiction over nonparty banks premature. See
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976 (NRB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129647, at
*1– 11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015) (granting plaintiff’s motion of default judgment without
discussing issues of specific personal jurisdiction over the nonparty banks); Tiffany (NJ)
LLC v. Qi Andrew, No. 10 Civ. 9471 (KPF) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77391, at *37
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2015) (declining to address the issues raised by the banks concerning
personal jurisdiction and comity).
20. For examples of media coverage and law firm publications, see Erika Kinetz,
Bank of China Ordered to Release Counterfeiter’s Records, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 7, 2015,
12:16 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/008d86537c0b4d40b8d2d9a95c34c861/
bank-china-ordered-release-counterfeiters-records; Owen Pell et al., The Second Circuit
Limits the Power of Courts to Enforce Asset Restraints and Discovery Orders Against Foreign
Banks, WHITE & CASE, http://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/second-circuit-
limits-power-courts-enforce-asset-restraints-and-discovery-orders (last visited Oct. 15,
2015).
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parties,21 lower federal courts have tackled the issue by applying the same
test they use to determine jurisdiction over civil defendants, whether
domestic or foreign.22  As the Second Circuit has recognized, there is no
case on point regarding whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
appropriate in the context of a foreign nonparty with only limited contacts
in the forum.23  With the growing volume and complexity of international
litigation in American courts,24 it would be important to assess such a test
and provide clear and consistent guidance to future nonparties, because
parties increasingly request documents from (distant) nonparties, such as
Chinese banks.
This Note assesses the specific personal jurisdiction test for foreign
nonparties applied in Gucci III.  It argues that nonparties do not have a
stake nor an interest in the conflict and that the exercise of specific per-
sonal jurisdiction has an extraterritorial effect affecting the sovereignty of
other nations when weighed against the “traditional notion of fair play and
substantial justice” due process demands.25  Part I of this Note recounts
the recent development of Supreme Court cases regarding personal juris-
diction over parties.  Part II briefly discusses how lower courts treat
domestic nonparties for jurisdictional purposes; it then proposes a revised
personal-jurisdiction analysis designed for foreign nonparties.  Part III dis-
cusses the facts and courts’ analyses of the Gucci II and Gucci III cases.
Part IV discusses the problems with the current analysis as applied to BOC
as a foreign nonparty in the Gucci III case and how courts should rule
under the proposed revised scheme.  Part V discusses the potential conse-
quences of upholding specific personal jurisdiction over foreign nonpar-
ties.  The Note concludes that due process imposes limitations on personal
jurisdiction over foreign nonparties, and that minimum contacts analysis
should apply to foreign nonparties.  The Note proposes that when assess-
ing whether the court should exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
foreign nonparty, however, the court should differentiate foreign nonpar-
ties from defendants on both the minimum contacts framework and rea-
sonableness prong by assigning more weight to international rapport and
the fact that nonparties have no stake or interest in the conflict.
I. From International Shoe to Daimler: Modern U.S. Jurisprudence of
Personal Jurisdiction
A. Minimum Contact
In Pennoyer v. Neff,26 the Supreme Court held that a tribunal’s juris-
diction over persons reaches no farther than the geographic bounds of the
21. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2014).
22. Id. at 136– 37.
23. Id. at 137– 38.
24. See, e.g., John H. Robinson, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law:
Preliminary Reflections, 27 J.C. & U.L. 187, 203 (2000).
25. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
26. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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forum.27  With time, however, that rigid territorial focus yielded to a less
strict approach, spurred by “changes in the technology of transportation
and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business
activity.”28
The Supreme Court introduced the touchstone modern due process
principle in International Shoe Co. v. Washington29 and held that before a
court may exercise jurisdiction over a person or an organization, that per-
son or entity must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”30  Following International Shoe, the central
concern of personal jurisdiction inquiries has focused on “the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutu-
ally exclusive sovereignty of the state on which the rules of Pennoyer
rest.”31
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman first proposed
the terms “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction” to categorize
courts’ treatment of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.32
The Supreme Court adopted their formulations nearly forty years after
International Shoe in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,33 and
for the first time, differentiated between general and specific jurisdiction.34
In Helicopteros, the Court concluded that the forum state has “specific
jurisdiction” over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum, and the forum state has “general jurisdic-
tion” over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.35
In a line of cases addressing specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
distilled the minimum contacts inquiry to two issues: (1) the “purposeful
availment” prong, whereby the court determines whether the defendant
purposefully directed his activities in the forum;36 and (2) the “related-
27. Id. at 720; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) (holding that
under Pennoyer, “any attempt directly to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons
or property would offend sister states and exceed the inherent limits of the state’s
power”).
28. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990).
29. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
30. Id.
31. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
32. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).  This article is the most cited
source in Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinions addressing the personal jurisdiction
issue.  Harvard Law Review, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 318 (2014)
(noting that von Mehren and Trautman’s thinking influenced Justice Ginsburg’s view of
personal jurisdiction).
33. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984).
34. Id. at 414 nn.8– 9.
35. Id.
36. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  The Supreme Court has sub-
sequently enforced this requirement of purposeful availment in several cases. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that when a
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ness” prong, whereby the court determines whether the litigation results
from alleged injuries that arise out of or are related to those activities in the
forum.37
To address whether exercising general jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant is proper, the Supreme Court in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v. Brown38 refined the International Shoe standard to require that
the contacts be “so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially
at home in the forum state.”39  The Goodyear Court explained that general
jurisdiction exists for an individual when the forum state is the individual’s
domicile; the Court also explained that general jurisdiction exists over a
corporation when the forum state is a place that the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home.40  Importantly, Goodyear emphasized that specific
jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory,
while general jurisdiction has played a reduced role.41
Although Goodyear recognized that general jurisdiction exists at the
corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business, the
opinion did not restrict general jurisdiction to those “paradigm” places.42
The Supreme Court clarified Goodyear in Daimler AG v. Bauman by hold-
ing that Daimler AG (“Daimler”), a German public stock company, could
not be subjected to California’s general jurisdiction in a suit filed by Argen-
tine plaintiffs over events occurring entirely outside the United States.43
The Court reasoned that Daimler was not “at home” in California, even
assuming that Daimler’s U.S. subsidiary was “at home” in California and
that the U.S. subsidiary’s contact could be imputed to it on an agency the-
ory.44  In sum, Daimler closes the door on expanding general personal
jurisdiction for corporations by reaffirming the restrictive test articulated
in Goodyear that foreign corporations are not subject to general personal
jurisdiction in a state unless they are “essentially at home” in that state—
general jurisdiction exists for a corporation when the forum state is its
principal place of business or the place of incorporation.45 Daimler fur-
corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit in that state); Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980) (noting that the defendant had not engaged in any purposeful
availment related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (noting that it is essential
that defendants purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of conducting activities
within the forum state to justify bringing them to suit there).
37. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). International
Shoe created the concept of relatedness, requiring the defendant to be connected to the
litigation. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316– 18 (1945).
38. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
39. Id. at 2851.
40. Id. at 2853– 54.
41. Id. at 2854; see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 610, 628 (1988).
42. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
43. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753– 63 (2014).
44. See id. at 759– 61.
45. See id. at 754.
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ther clarified that where the alter ego test46 is not satisfied, a corporate
subsidiary’s sizeable sales in the forum state or the importance of its ser-
vices to its parent are not sufficient to support general jurisdiction over a
foreign parent corporation.47 Daimler reiterated the Supreme Court’s posi-
tion on personal jurisdiction in Goodyear by concluding that general juris-
diction has played a reduced role in modern jurisdiction theory.48
B. Reasonableness
Having established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state,
a court then considers several additional factors to assess the reasonable-
ness of exercising specific jurisdiction over the defendant.49  In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court listed several factors while considering the
reasonableness of jurisdiction: (1) “the burden on the defendant,” (2) “the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (3) “the plaintiff’s inter-
est in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) “the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies,” and (5) the “shared interest of the several states in furthering funda-
mental substantive social policies.”50  However, in contrast to the burden
of establishing sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, which is
placed on the plaintiff, the burden to persuade the court that the exercise of
specific jurisdiction is unreasonable belongs to the defendant.51  There-
fore, when a plaintiff has shown that a defendant has purposefully directed
his activities in a forum state, the defendant must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.52  On the other hand, if a plaintiff presents a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required, the considera-
tions suggested in World-Wide Volkswagen would sometimes serve to estab-
lish the reasonableness of jurisdiction.53  Justice Brennan quietly reiterated
this in the Burger King opinion to undermine the minimum contacts test so
that a defendant’s insufficient minimum contacts would not be fatal, per-
haps even doing so unethically.54  Although subsequent cases have ignored
this part of Burger King, the Supreme Court has not overruled that holding,
46. The two prongs of the “alter ego” test are as follows: “(1) that there is such unity
of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the two entities no longer
exist and (2) that failure to disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or
injustice.  The first prong of this test has alternately been stated as requiring a showing
that the parent controls the subsidiary to such a degree as to render the latter the mere
instrumentality of the former.”  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)).
47. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759– 61.
48. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
49. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.  The reasonableness test will only be invoked in
a case where the court is exercising specific jurisdiction.  When a corporation is deter-
mined to be genuinely “at home” in the forum state, “any second-step inquiry [of reason-
ableness] would be superfluous.” See id.
50. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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and it is therefore still good law.  Notably, in situations where defendants
purposefully engage in forum activities, defendants may still defeat specific
jurisdiction if the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.55
The Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California specifically addressed the reasonableness prong in evaluating
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign country defendant.56
Although the Asahi court did not agree on the minimum contact analysis,
eight justices agreed that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a Japa-
nese defendant was unreasonable and unfair, so as to violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.57
In Asahi, Gary Zurcher was severely injured and his wife was killed
after the motorcycle that they were riding collided with a tractor on a Cali-
fornia highway.58  Zurcher filed a products liability suit in California state
court, alleging that the motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant were defective.59
Zucher named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial, Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese
manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant.60  Cheng Shin then filed a third-
party cross-complaint against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the Japanese
corporation that manufactured the valve assembly of the tube.61  Asahi
moved to quash the service of this third-party complaint, arguing that the
California court could not assert personal jurisdiction over it.62  In sup-
port of this motion, Asahi’s president submitted an affidavit indicating that
Asahi never contemplated that it could be subject to suit in California
through Asahi’s sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan.63  The Califor-
nia court denied the motion and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.64
When addressing the reasonableness prong, the Asahi court first con-
sidered the “severe” burden California litigation would impose upon Asahi
and noted that Asahi not only had to travel the distance between Japan and
California, but also submit the dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign
nation’s judicial system.65  The Court noted that “[t]he unique burdens
placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
55. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477– 78.  Assertion of specific jurisdiction, which is
determined to be unreasonable, would contradict the traditional notion of “fair play and
substantial justice.” Id. at 476 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945)).
56. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113– 15 (1987).
57. Id. at 116.  Justice Scalia concurred with this portion of Justice O’Connor’s opin-
ion, finding that there were constitutionally insufficient minimum contacts. Id. at
121– 22.
58. Id. at 105.




63. Id. at 107.
64. Id.  The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States after the Supreme
Court of California reversed and discharged the writ issued by the Court of Appeal of
the State of California, which commended the Superior Court to quash service of sum-
mons. Id. at 107– 08.
65. Id. at 114.
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have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the
long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”66
The Court then assessed the interests of both the plaintiff and the
forum and held that such interests played a slight role in the jurisdictional
question over Asahi.67  The court emphasized that Cheng Shin, as the
third-party plaintiff, had not demonstrated that it would be more conve-
nient to litigate its claim against Asahi in California rather than in Taiwan
or Japan.68
Finally, the Supreme Court was extremely concerned about “the inter-
ests of the ‘several states,’ . . . in the efficient judicial resolution of the
dispute and the advancement of substantive police.”69  Given the interna-
tional components of the case, the Court explicitly held that in the interna-
tional context, the procedural and substantive interests of other nations in
a court’s assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant as well as the
Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations policies, deserved a
careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction.70
Having conducted thorough analysis of the reasonableness prong in evalu-
ating the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi, the Court had no
difficulty concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was
unreasonable.71
II. Revised Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Nonparties
Although the above-discussed framework is well suited for determin-
ing whether a court could assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the
Supreme Court has not addressed specific jurisdiction over nonparties.72
The case that comes closest is Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,73 in which the
Court considered whether due process protection could be applied to a
non-defendant.74  In that case, the defendant argued that the Kansas court
lacked personal jurisdiction over absent non-named class-action plaintiffs,
who automatically joined the case through a class “opt out” notice and
lacked any pre-litigation contacts with the forum state.75  The Supreme
Court upheld the Kansas trial court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction




69. Id. at 115.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 116.
72. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2014).
The preferred route for roping foreign nonparties into general jurisdiction is specific
jurisdiction, mainly because for a corporation, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.  As a
result, there would be many less-qualified forums to subject foreign nonparties to gen-
eral jurisdiction as compared to the number of forums to subject foreign nonparties to
specific jurisdiction.
73. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
74. See generally id.
75. Id. at 802.
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minimum contacts analysis was originally designed to protect defendants
from litigation in a distant forum,76 “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
protect ‘persons,’ not ‘defendants.’”77  Specifically, the Court reasoned that
the Due Process Clause does not and need not afford an absent class plain-
tiff as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it does an absent
defendant in non-class suit.78  Therefore, a state places fewer burdens upon
the former than it does upon the latter.79  Only a minimum procedural due
process protection, rather than minimum contacts, is required for a forum
state to exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class plaintiff.80
In assessing the question whether federal courts may properly exer-
cise jurisdiction over a domestic nonparty, the courts have adapted the sim-
ilar minimum contacts test used for defendants.81  In the international
context, the Ninth Circuit in Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin concluded that
district courts lack the specific personal jurisdiction to order foreign non-
party banks without contacts in the United States to comply with an asset
freeze injunction.82 McLaughlin, however, does not provide much gui-
dance on how to conduct the minimum contacts analysis in the context of
a foreign nonparty with only limited contacts in the forum state.  First, the
district court found that the foreign nonparty had a “super contact” with
the forum state, because defendant’s act of assisting in an injunction viola-
tion through aiding and abetting amounted to a contact, albeit significantly
different from the traditional meaning of “contact” under the minimum
contacts framework.83  Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court lacked specific personal jurisdiction mainly because of international
comity considerations— the court emphasized that the simple fact that “the
mandate of an injunction issued by a federal district court runs nation-
wide” did not apply to a situation where “[a] national of a foreign coun-
try . . . followed the law . . . of its own country . . . when it did acts within
that country.”84  No other case has applied this analysis in the context of a
foreign nonparty with only limited contacts in the forum state.85  Law
review articles have addressed this issue narrowly, determining the applica-
bility of specific jurisdiction over a nonparty when assessing the nonparty
76. Id. at 807.




81. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 137 (2d Cir. 2014).
These courts first evaluate the relevance between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum
state and the order at issue, and then decide whether asserting jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of the order would be consistent with fair play and substantial justice. See, e.g.,
Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the S.E.C. v. Knowles,
87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding specific jurisdiction where the “subpoena
enforcement action” at issue “ar[ose] out of [the nonparty’s] contacts” with the forum).
82. See Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391– 95 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. See id. at 1391.
84. See id. at 1391, 1394.
85. Gucci II, 768 F.3d at 137.
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discovery requests.86
Therefore, much discussion is needed on the injury of how to evaluate
specific jurisdiction over foreign nonparties in general.  This Note pro-
poses that the due process minimum contacts analysis should still apply to
foreign nonparties, albeit with some alterations to reflect parties and non-
parties’ differing interests in the underlying lawsuit.  The adequate mini-
mum contacts analysis for foreign nonparties would focus on: (1)
nonparties’ contacts with the forum state and (2) the relatedness between
such contacts and the party’s cause of action.
Regarding the reasonableness inquiry, the five-factor balancing test
outlined in World-Wide Volkswagen87 should be adjusted to reflect the dif-
ference between the foreign nonparty and the defendant.  Explicitly, when
determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign non-
party, the reasonableness prong’s balancing test should involve the follow-
ing: (1) “the burden on the [foreign nonparty],”88 (2) the nonparty’s
interest in not being involved with the plaintiff’s lawsuit, (3) “the forum
state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,”89 (4) “the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief,”90 (5) “the interstate judicial sys-
tem’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,”91
(6) the procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a court’s
assertion of jurisdiction over an alien nonparty,92 and (7) the federal gov-
ernment’s interest in its foreign relations policies.93  Although the last two
factors were explicitly articulated under the due process reasonableness
prong in Asahi, federal courts usually either neglect analyzing them or dis-
cuss them separately in the international comity analysis.94
A. Minimum Contacts for Foreign Nonparty
As previously discussed, in Philips Petroleum, the Supreme Court held
that because the Fourteenth Amendment protects “persons,” as opposed to
only “defendants,” the Due Process Clause protection, and by extension,
the minimum contacts framework, extends to plaintiffs as well.95  Along
the same line of reasoning, the minimum contacts framework should also
86. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Note, Minimum Contacts, No Dog: Evaluating Personal
Jurisdiction for Nonparty Discovery, 88 MINN. L. REV. 968, 1005– 06 (2004).





92. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci III), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 135 F.
Supp. 3d 87, 94 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) (explicitly declining to consider China’s sub-
stantive interest in the Chinese bank secrecy law, in the context of assessing the reasona-
bleness of an exercise of personal jurisdiction); see also Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495,
1501 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[a]ny clash between the forum law and the substan-
tive policies of another state” should be considered through choice-of-law rule rather
than through personal jurisdiction analysis).
95. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
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apply to foreign nonparties.  Seventy years after International Shoe, the min-
imum contacts framework has become the only modern standard for evalu-
ating personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause96 and there is no
sign that the Court will deviate from its current personal jurisdiction’s
jurisprudence.97  Therefore, unless the Court changes direction, the mini-
mum contacts analysis must serve as the incumbent technique when evalu-
ating personal jurisdiction over both defendants and foreign nonparties.
Specifically, the “purposeful availment” prong should remain the same in
the context of foreign nonparties, so courts can determine whether the for-
eign nonparties’ in-forum conducts were “deliberate and recurring,” rather
than “random, isolated[,] or fortuitous.”98
The second prong of the minimum contracts inquiry, relatedness,
should be modified to reflect the difference between parties and nonpar-
ties.  In the context of a foreign nonparty, the appropriate inquiry for the
“relatedness” prong should assess the relatedness between a nonparty’s in-
forum activities and the parties’ cause of actions in the underlying law-
suit.99  More specifically, the court should evaluate whether a plaintiff’s
causes of action fall within a nonparty’s foreseeable zone-of-risk based on
its in-forum contacts.  This modified relatedness prong allows courts to
determine whether the controversy in the underlying lawsuit arose out of
or related to the nonparty’s in-forum conducts.  This reading of the related-
ness prong is consistent with its meaning in the context of a defendant, in
which a state can exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the
cause of action “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum.”100  Indeed, the foreseeable-zone-of-risk standard complies with
the due process demands because it provides a nonparty an opportunity to
assess to what extent it should operate its business in the forum state so
that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”101
B. Reasonableness for Foreign Nonparty
Most factors of the modified balancing test of assessing the specific
jurisdiction over a foreign nonparty are similar to those articulated in the
previous section adopted for assessing the specific jurisdiction over a
defendant.  The only differences are the following factors: (2) the non-
96. See Twitchell, supra note 41, at 611; Scott, supra note 86, at 1003. R
97. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (adopting the mini-
mum contacts framework in the most recent case involving the issue of personal
jurisdiction).
98. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2013); Gucci III,
135 F. Supp. 3d at 97.
99. See Ramirez v. Lagunes, 794 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App. 1990) (dismissing a bill
of discovery against a nonparty bank for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that
“merely locating monies in a Texas bank account did not invoke the court’s jurisdiction
because . . . the cause of action [for divorce did not arise] from the opening of those
accounts”).
100. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984).
101. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
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party’s interest in not being involved with the plaintiff’s lawsuit, (6) other
nations’ procedural and substantive interests in a court’s assertion of juris-
diction over an alien nonparty, which replaces the original factor of “shared
interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies,” and (7) the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations
policies.  Because “the burden on the [foreign nonparty]” analysis is not
significantly different from the original “burden on the defendant” analy-
sis, it is not listed as a difference.
To accurately reflect the difference between a defendant and a non-
party, a nonparty’s interest in not being involved with the plaintiff’s lawsuit
should be assessed closely within the minimum contacts framework.
When determining whether exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-
party would accord with the “fair play and substantial justice” overall due
process demands, a court should recognize that nonparty status might
affect the equities of asserting jurisdiction.102  On the one hand, a “person
who is subjected to liability . . . far from home may have better cause to
complain of an outrage to fair play” than a nonparty.103  In such a situa-
tion, a court should have little difficulty exercising specific jurisdiction
over a nonparty, assuming the purposeful availment prong and relatedness
prong are both satisfied.  On the other hand, “a nonparty with few if any
connections to the activities giving rise to the suit may have a strong inter-
est in its freedom to take actions that are ‘genuinely independent’ of any
intent to frustrate a court’s injunction.”104  In the nonparty discovery con-
text, some courts recognize that, unlike parties who would expect invasive
discovery in modern litigation, “[n]onparties have a different set of expec-
tations,” and “concerns for the unwanted burden thrust upon non-parties
is a factor entitled to special weight in evaluating the balance of competing
needs.”105  In this situation, a court should give due concern to a non-
party’s interest in not being involved with the plaintiff’s lawsuit.
When a nonparty has only limited, yet sufficient, minimum contacts
with a forum, and a plaintiff’s injury does not arise out of the nonparty’s
in-forum contacts, a court should weigh heavily the nonparty’s interest in
its freedom and should treat such a nonparty as a complete stranger to the
lawsuit.  In this case, the court should be more reluctant to exercise spe-
cific personal jurisdiction.  On the other hand, when a nonparty’s contacts
with the forum are more substantial, and a plaintiff’s injury falls within the
nonparty’s foreseeable zone-of-risk, the nonparty’s “complaint of an out-
rage to fair play” should weigh less.  In such a scenario, the court should
treat the nonparty as a party and feel more comfortable exercising specific
personal jurisdiction.
102. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 137 n.17 (2d Cir.
2014).
103. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1998).
104. Gucci II, 768 F.3d at 137 n.17 (citing Heyman v. Kline, 444 F.2d 65, 65– 66 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
105. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998); see Haworth,
Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 998 F.2d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Dart Indus. Co. v. West-
wood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980).
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In the context of a foreign nonparty, and especially when the subject
matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question,106 a court, in the reason-
ableness inquiry, should consider both (1) the procedural and substantive
interests of other nations which are affected by the assertion of jurisdic-
tion, and (2) the federal government’s interest in its foreign relations poli-
cies.107  Although these two factors are similar to those of the international
comity analysis,108 a court should consider them in the due process frame-
work instead.  Due process concerns relate to a court’s power over a foreign
nonparty, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits
state courts’ power to exercise personal jurisdiction over an entity.109  In
contrast, international comity, in the legal sense, is not “a matter of abso-
lute obligation,”110 and therefore state courts do not have an obligation to
conduct international comity analysis.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s intention to include those two factors
as a part of due process demands is clear.  In Asahi, the Court explicitly
explained that a court in evaluating the reasonableness in exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant should take into consideration the
interests of the “several [s]tates,” and when the entity is an international
one, the court should consider such interests as “the procedural and sub-
stantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the asser-
tion of jurisdiction.”111  Moreover, the Asahi Court also held that “the
106. When the subject matter is a federal question, the United States’ substantive
interests in enforcing U.S. law become much stronger than in the context of diversity
jurisdiction.
107. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403.  Section 403(2) iden-
tifies eight non-exclusive factors of the international comity analysis to be evaluated
when determining whether a court should exercise jurisdiction over an entity in a given
case:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activ-
ity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or eco-
nomic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
109. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
110. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987).
111. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
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Federal interest in Government’s foreign relations policies [would] be best
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of juris-
diction in the particular case.”112  The same reasoning is reinforced in the
recent Daimler case.113
III. Gucci on Appeal and Remand
A. Background of Gucci cases
In or around June 2010, Gucci and its affiliates (“plaintiffs”) discov-
ered that defendants were selling counterfeit versions of plaintiffs’ products
on the Internet.114  On June 25, 2010, plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against
defendants pursuant to the Lanham Act, and related state-law causes of
action.115  Plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that the profits from
defendants’ allegedly illicit operation were wired to specific accounts at the
Chinese headquarters of BOC.116  The district court granted plaintiffs’ pre-
liminary injunction request and, following the injunction and pursuant to
FRCP 45, plaintiffs served BOC with a subpoena (the “2010 Subpoena”) to
force BOC to turn over documents related to “any BOC accounts main-
tained by [d]efendants.”117  The 2010 Subpoena named two specific BOC
accounts.118  In February 2011, plaintiffs served BOC with a second sub-
poena (the “2011 Subpoena”), which included the two accounts identified
in the 2010 Subpoena, along with six additional accounts.119
On August 23, 2011, the district court issued an order (the “August
23rd Order”) that granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel BOC to comply with
the 2010 Subpoena and the asset freeze provisions of the injunction.120
The district court further denied BOC’s cross-motion to modify the injunc-
tion to try to exclude assets held by BOC in any of its locations in
China.121  Ultimately, BOC produced documents relating to the two
accounts identified in the 2010 Subpoena.122
On November 30, 2011, BOC moved for reconsideration of the district
court’s August 23rd Order on the basis that China would likely impose
sanctions on BOC if it complied with the Order.123  To support its motion
for reconsideration, BOC cited a November 3, 2011 letter that the district
112. Id.
113. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) (quoting Asahi Metal
Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 115) (recognizing that “the procedural and substantive policies of
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction” was indeed a
factor to assess the reasonableness of exercising specific jurisdiction over an entity).
114. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci III), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 135 F. Supp. 3d







121. Id. at 92.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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court received from the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (collectively, the “Chinese Regulators”).124  In the
letter, the Chinese Regulators informed the district court that:
(i) China’s banking confidentiality laws prohibit banks such as BOC from
disclosing information about accounts located in China or freezing or turn-
ing over funds in such accounts pursuant to a U.S. court order; (ii) China
has “material interests” in the enforcement of its banking confidentiality
laws and the Chinese government believes those laws to be an important
part of engendering client confidence in China’s relatively undeveloped
banking system, thereby promoting its further development; and (iii) U.S.
court orders compelling production of bank account information located in
China or freezing or turning over assets located in China will have an
adverse impact on U.S.– China relations and ongoing efforts to foster cross-
border legal cooperation.125
The letter also stated that BOC’s production of documents identified in the
2010 Subpoena violated Chinese bank secrecy law, and explained that as a
result, the Chinese Regulators had issued a stern warning and were evaluat-
ing appropriate further sanctions against BOC.126  In the letter, the Chi-
nese Regulators also expressed commitment to the Hague Convention’s
procedures for document requests.127
On May 18, 2012, the district court denied BOC’s motion for recon-
sideration, and BOC appealed the district court’s August 23rd and May
18th orders to the Second Circuit.128  On September 17, 2014, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s authority to issue the injunction.129
Nevertheless, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion on general
personal jurisdiction in Daimler, the Second Circuit vacated the August
23rd and May 18th orders enforcing the injunction and the 2010 Sub-
poena.130  The case was then remanded to the district court to consider
whether the district court has specific personal jurisdiction over BOC to
compel compliance with these orders, and if so, whether exercising such
jurisdiction is consistent with international comity.131
On December 1, 2014, plaintiffs moved to compel BOC’s compliance
with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas.132  BOC filed its memorandum of law
in opposition to the motion to compel on January 23, 2015, and plaintiffs
then filed their reply memorandum of law.133  After the matter was fully
briefed, the district court in Gucci III held that it “has specific personal
124. Id.
125. Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Reconsideration at 4– 5, Gucci
Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10-cv-04974-RJS (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2011), ECF No. 90
[hereinafter Letters from Chinese Regulators] (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id.
128. Gucci III, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 92.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 145 (2d Cir. 2014).
132. Gucci III, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 92.  On remand, plaintiffs did not move to compel
BOC to comply with an asset freeze injunction.
133. Id.
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jurisdiction over BOC with respect to the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas and
that exercising such jurisdiction comports with due process and principles
of comity.”134
B. Legal Analysis of Gucci Cases
1. Gucci I: It is All About Comity
The district court in Gucci I discussed two issues: first, whether the
district court has authority to restrain defendants’ overseas assets, and sec-
ond, whether the district court has power to enforce a subpoena to compel
BOC to produce defendants’ account information located in China.135  As
to the first issue, the district court reasoned that “subject to the principles
of equity,”136 the Lanham Act entitles a plaintiff who establishes a viola-
tion of his rights in connection with a registered trademark to recover
defendant’s profits.137  Once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained,
the district court has authority to issue an injunction to freeze the property
under the party’s control.138  Therefore, whether the district court has per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonparty is irrelevant with respect to the district
court’s authority to issue an asset restraint order.
As to the second issue, the district court did not entertain the issue of
personal jurisdiction over BOC; rather, the district court focused on con-
flicts of law139 and employed the five-factor comity analysis set forth in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 442(1)(c).140  Section 442(1)(c) requires the consideration of five factors:
134. Id. at 104.
135. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci I), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97814, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2015).
137. Gucci I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *8.
138. Id. at *12.
139. Various Chinese banking laws allegedly conflicted with U.S. laws:
(a) Article 6 of the Commercial Bank Law, stating that “commercial banks shall
safeguard the legal rights and interests of depositors against the encroachment
of any entity or individual”;
(b) Article 24 of the Corporate Deposit Regulation, stating that “a financial
institution shall keep secret the deposits of corporate depositors”;
(c) The Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’Assistance in
the Inquiry into, Freeze, or Deduction of Deposits, requiring that any of the
foregoing actions may be taken only if (1) the request for inquiry into, freezing,
or debiting funds is from an “authorized governmental entity” and (2) such
authorized governmental agency presents the bank with a notice confirming the
latter’s assistance with the inquiry into, or freezing, or deduction of funds;
(d) Various damages provisions, providing for fines of up to RMB 500,000
Yuan, civil liability, and disciplinary punishment for personnel by the institu-
tion itself; and
(e) Article 253(A) of China’s Criminal Law, providing for criminal liability with
a term of imprisonment of up to three years for personnel at financial institu-
tions who illegally provide personal information of citizen account holders to
others in violation of Chinese law.
See Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
140. Gucci I, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 97814, at *15– 16.  The reason why the issue of
personal jurisdiction was not discussed in the decision is that, prior to Daimler, prece-
dent in the Second Circuit was clear that a foreign bank with a branch in New York was
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(i) “the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested;” (ii) “the degree of specificity of the request;”
(iii) “whether the information originated in the United States;” (iv) “the
availability of alternative means of securing the information;” and (v) “the
extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine impor-
tant interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the state where the information is
located.”141
While analyzing the five-factor test, the district court in Gucci I reached a
different conclusion to the similarly situated case in Qi Andrew, and found
that the test strongly weighed in favor of ordering BOC to comply with the
subpoena.142  The difference mainly focused on factor four (whether a
Hague Convention request to China was an “alternative means” for plain-
tiffs to obtain the documents sought), and factor five (balance of national
interests).143
The Gucci I court held that plaintiffs provided evidence that suggested
the “Hague Convention is of limited utility in China in large part because
its implementation remains uncertain and unpredictable.”  Therefore, a
Hague Convention request to China was not a viable alternative method of
securing the information plaintiffs sought.144  Moreover, the Gucci I court
stated that a finding that there was some likelihood of compliance with the
Convention did not end the inquiry; rather, the particular facts of the case
had to be scrutinized to determine the “likelihood that resort to those pro-
cedures w[ould] prove effective.”145
In balancing the states’ interests under the fifth factor, the Gucci I
court found that U.S. interest in enforcing the Lanham Act outweighed
China’s “limited” interest in enforcing its bank secrecy laws, particularly
because the protections under China’s bank secrecy laws could be waived
by individuals and certain public bodies (specifically, the “people’s court,”
“taxation authority,” “public security organ,” “industrial commercial
administrative organ,” and “securities regulation organ”).  The court rea-
soned that this suggested that these laws “merely confer an individual priv-
ilege on customers rather than reflect a national policy entitled to
substantial deference.”146
properly subject to general personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94– 95 (2d Cir. 2000).  Under prior controlling precedent of the
Second Circuit, BOC was subject to general jurisdiction because it engaged in a continu-
ous and systematic course of doing business in New York through the activity of its New
York branch. See Gucci Am. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir.
2014).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(1)(c).
142. Gucci I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *27.
143. See Chang & Chang, supra note 3, at 432– 33. R
144. Gucci I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *27.
145. Id. at *34– 35 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at *29.
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2. Gucci II: Think Twice
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s authority to
issue the asset freeze injunction and held that personal jurisdiction over
the defendants, not nonparty BOC, was all that was required for the district
court to restrain the defendants’ assets pending trial.147  The Second Cir-
cuit, however, vacated the district court’s August 23rd Order that com-
pelled BOC to comply with the injunction and subpoenas.  The Second
Circuit reasoned that a district court can enforce an injunction and a sub-
poena against a nonparty only if it has personal jurisdiction over that non-
party.148  In light of the Daimler decision, the Second Circuit held that the
district court erred in subjecting BOC to general jurisdiction in New York
merely because BOC engaged in a continuous and systematic course of
doing business in New York through the activity of its New York branch.149
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider
whether it may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over BOC and, if so,
whether proper application of the principles of comity allows the exercise
of specific personal jurisdiction.150
3. Gucci III: Nothing but Specific
On remand, the district court first held that New York’s long-arm stat-
ute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction.151  The district court then
conducted a jurisdictional inquiry and concluded that exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction met constitutional due process demands.
Under the minimum contacts inquiry, the district court determined
that BOC’s in-forum conduct is “deliberate and recurring, not random, iso-
lated[,] or fortuitous,” which amounts to purposeful availment, because
“BOC has significant operations, employees, and physical locations in New
York, actively solicits business and customers in New York, . . . [and] pro-
vides extensive services to its clients in New York, including a correspon-
dent account at Chase that its Head Office established to facilitate U.S.
dollar-denominated transfers.”152  As to the relatedness prong of the mini-
mum contact inquiry, the district court determined that BOC’s in-forum
contacts are a “but-for” cause of plaintiffs’ document requests.  The district
court reasoned that plaintiffs’ subpoenas were based on the fact that
defendants’ proceeds from the sale of counterfeit goods were transferred
through BOC’s correspondent account in New York.153
147. Gucci Am. v. Bank of China (Gucci II), 768 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2014).
148. Id. at 134.
149. Id. at 133, 136.
150. Id. at 145.
151. The statute provides that a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within
the state” so long as the plaintiff’s “cause of action aris[es] from” that “transact[ion].”
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci III), No. 10 Civ. 4974
(RJS), 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).
152. Gucci III, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 98.
153. Id. at 99.
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The district court also concluded that the exercise of personal juris-
diction comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.154  First, the district court reasoned that BOC’s subjection to
jurisdiction in New York was not burdensome given that BOC maintained
physical operations there and had previously initiated multiple lawsuits in
the state.155  Second, the district court determined that the forum state had
a “manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents,” given that plaintiffs are incorporated in New York and have their
principal place of business there.156  Third, plaintiffs had a strong interest
in BOC complying with the subpoenas because the documents sought
would likely provide an effective measure of the revenues generated by
defendants, and the alternative means (a Hague Convention request) might
not be viable to solve the dispute.157  Fourth, the international judicial sys-
tem’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy
favors the exercise of jurisdiction over BOC, since it would provide the fast-
est and most practical means of resolving the dispute.158  Finally, a balance
of the substantive social policies at issue tips towards exercising personal
jurisdiction, since plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining documents and the
United States’ interest in enforcing the Lanham Act outweigh BOC’s inter-
est in resisting compliance and China’s interest in its bank secrecy laws.159
In its comity analysis, the district court considered how both the Beij-
ing Intermediate Court Judgment and Beijing High Court Judgment (the
Beijing judgments) affected its comity analysis in Gucci I.  On remand, the
district court reasoned that the Beijing judgments did not support BOC’s
assertion that China’s bank secrecy laws are rigidly enforced and trump
the United States’ interest in enforcing the Lanham Act.  The court held
that the balancing of national interests still clearly weighs in favor of plain-
tiffs.160  As to the hardship of compliance factor, the district court con-
cluded that it weighed in favor of plaintiffs because BOC provided no legal
authority to support the conclusion that Chinese banks are liable for dis-
closing their clients’ bank account information.  Moreover, the court rea-
soned that the Beijing judgments only resulted in the equivalent of $22.00
in court fees.161
IV. Would the Result Be Different?— Applying Proposed Scheme to
Gucci
A. Minimum Contact Inquiry
Under the proposed revised scheme, the purposeful availment prong
of the minimum contact inquiry would remain the same as in Gucci III.
154. Id. at 101.
155. Id. at 99.
156. Id. at 100.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 100– 01.
160. Id. at 103.
161. Id. at 104.
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Relatedness, the second prong of the minimum contacts inquiry, however,
would be different.  Under the proposed revised scheme, the appropriate
inquiry would assess the relatedness between a nonparty’s in-forum con-
tacts and the causes of action between the parties in the initial lawsuit.  To
be more precise, the courts would be required to evaluate whether the
plaintiffs’ alleged causes of action fall within a nonparty’s foreseeable zone-
of-risk of its in-forum contacts.
Here, BOC’s in-forum contacts are providing banking services to its
clients to facilitate financial transactions; whereas Gucci’s alleged cause of
action in the underlying lawsuit is trademark infringement.162  Arguably,
Gucci’s alleged trademark infringement does not fall within the foreseeable
zone-of-risk of BOC’s banking services.  In the modern commercial world,
almost every financial activity involves transferring funds, and if every
transfer of funds within a bank’s foreseeable zone-of-risk then that bank
constantly would be purposefully availing the forum and would therefore
be subject to specific personal jurisdiction of the forum state.  Moreover,
such an expansive view of relatedness would increase banks’ costs of com-
pliance because banks would be required to monitor all transactions to
properly assess whether the transactions involve any illegal activity.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, from BOC’s perspec-
tive, transactions of proceeds generated from alleged trademark infringe-
ment are no different from other legal transactions: no fact suggests that
the defendant in the underlying lawsuit should require extra attention
from BOC.  Therefore, if the defendants’ alleged wrongdoings were not
within nonparty BOC’s foreseeable zone-of-risk, there is essentially no
means for BOC to be aware of the potential litigation, such as the one in the
Gucci cases.
A natural question one might ask is what types of offenses would be in
a bank’s foreseeable zone-of-risk to subject a foreign nonparty bank to the
forum’s jurisdiction.  One answer to this question would be a construc-
tively fraudulent transfer.163  In this situation, an insolvent debtor, without
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor, transfers
funds from his account at a bank’s New York branch to another account at
the bank’s overseas branch.  A creditor of the debtor could obtain a court
order to require the bank to produce documents of the debtor’s account
information.  In this example, the bank would still be a nonparty to the
underlying claim, yet, the underlying claim of constructively fraudulent
transfer is arguably within the bank’s foreseeable zone-of-risk.  Notably, in
this hypothetical, the bank does not aid and abet in the assistance of the
162. Id. at 91, 95.
163. U.F.T.A. § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). The code provides that:
a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor
whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a rea-
sonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the
debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of
the transfer or obligation.
Id.
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transfer, because it is a constructive fraudulent transfer rather than actual
fraudulent transfer.
Thus, unlike the conclusion in Gucci III, under the proposed revised
scheme, BOC’s in-forum contacts would fall on the less substantial end of
the sliding scale test because Gucci’s cause of actions are not within BOC’s
foreseeable zone-of-risk, which awakens the relatedness inquiry.
B. Reasonableness
As previously explained, the first different factor for the reasonable-
ness inquiry is the second factor— the nonparty’s interest in not being
involved with the plaintiff’s lawsuit.  In the present case, because Gucci’s
alleged cause of action is not within BOC’s foreseeable zone-of-risk, BOC,
as a nonparty, has a different set of expectations than if it were the defen-
dant in the initial litigation.  As a defendant, BOC would have expected
invasive discovery; as a nonparty, the subpoenas came unexpectedly.
Hence, the district court should give due concern to BOC’s interest in not
being involved with the Gucci lawsuit, and weigh this factor in BOC’s favor.
The second different factor is the sixth factor— other nations’ procedu-
ral and substantive interests in a court’s assertion of jurisdiction over an
alien nonparty.  Although BOC failed to provide cases to support its asser-
tion that China’s bank secrecy laws are rigidly enforced, it is inappropriate
for a U.S. court to second guess China’s laws by saying “China’s bank
secrecy laws merely confer an individual privilege on customers rather
than reflect a national policy . . . .”164  Such a conclusion is especially
imprudent considering the various Chinese Regulators’ letters to the court
stressing the significance of Chinese bank secrecy laws to its national pol-
icy.165  Understandably, a U.S. court might not want to concede that
China’s interest in protecting its bank account holders’ information is more
significant than the U.S.’s trademark enforcement interests.  The court
should rule that, on balance, this factor does not tilt the balance in favor of
either Gucci or BOC.
Last but not least, the seventh factor— the Federal Government’s inter-
est in deciding its foreign relations policies— should tip the scale decidedly
towards BOC.166  The expansive assertion of specific jurisdiction over for-
eign nonparty BOC could be dangerous to U.S. companies engaging in
international commerce: retaliatory laws could empower foreign courts to
exercise judicial jurisdiction over U.S. companies simply because a U.S.
court exercised jurisdiction over companies from those nations.167  An
expansive exercise of judicial jurisdiction would also result in unpredict-
ability and thus deter cross-border investment.168  Finally, U.S. courts’
expansive views of personal jurisdiction have previously impeded negotia-
tions to form international agreements to ensure the reciprocal recognition
164. Gucci III, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 98.
165. Letters from Chinese Regulators, supra note 125, at 4– 5.
166. See discussion infra Section V.
167. See infra notes 174– 80 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 181– 83 and accompanying text.
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and enforcement of judgments.169
V. The Butterfly Effect
The district court’s reasoning behind its decision to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over foreign nonparty BOC was broad.  The fact that
the district court reached this conclusion by reasoning that BOC purpose-
fully availed itself of the forum could be applied to most financial institu-
tions in New York City: an institution has significant operations,
employees, and physical locations in New York, actively solicits business
and customers in New York, and provides extensive services to its clients in
New York.170  The district court’s order is significant: a U.S. court can exer-
cise jurisdiction over a foreign nonparty to produce documents located
outside of the U.S., with the possibility that the nonparty would be subject
to sanctions in its home country.  After all, “[j]urisdiction is power to
declare the law.”171  Exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign non-
party could be quite intrusive, especially when subjecting the nonparty to
the forum’s jurisdiction might result in sanctions from the nonparty’s
home state.
A. Potential Retaliatory Actions from Other Nations
Foreign states have expressed objections to the United States’ expan-
sive assertion of judicial jurisdiction.172 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that perceived affronts to sovereign interests will predictably “invite
retaliatory action from other nations.”173  As the dissenters in Daimler
noted, sweeping notions of jurisdiction by imputation threaten United
States companies with retaliatory assertions of judicial jurisdiction by for-
eign courts— “several countries have enacted ‘retaliatory jurisdiction
laws.’”174  Under these retaliatory laws, these countries’ courts may exer-
cise jurisdiction over foreign persons “in circumstances where the courts
of the foreigner’s home state would have asserted jurisdiction.”175
The risks of retaliatory jurisdiction are more than hypothetical.  In
fact, even the United States’ close trading partners have engaged in similar
retaliations.  The United Kingdom, for instance, enacted the Protection of
169. See infra notes 184– 87 and accompanying text.
170. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li (Gucci III), No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 135 F. Supp. 3d
87, 98 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).
171. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786– 87 (2011) (plurality).
172. Brief of Economiesuisse & the Swiss bankers Association et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 8, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965)
[hereinafter Brief of Economiesuisse & the Swiss bankers Association et al.].
173. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963).
174. Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 779 (2011) (O’Scannlian, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
175. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 15 (1987).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN306.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-APR-17 14:45
768 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
Trading Interests Act 1980 (“the Protection Act”)176 to authorize the Secre-
tary of State to prohibit UK firms from complying with foreign laws and/or
complying with any requirement to submit information to any foreign
authority beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign authority.177
The Protection Act’s Section 6 also provides a “clawback” provision enti-
tling UK citizens to recover any noncompensatory damages paid to a victo-
rious plaintiff in a foreign court.178  In the discovery context, some nations
have passed legislation that punishes compliance with U.S. courts’ discov-
ery orders.179  Similarly, Italian courts “will exercise jurisdiction over
actions by Italian nationals against foreigners, provided that the foreigner’s
courts would entertain claims against Italians in like circumstances.”180
More precisely, applied to the rule announced in Gucci III, these laws
would allow foreign courts to assert jurisdiction over U.S. companies, and
only U.S. companies, to produce documents located in the United States,
based simply on the availability of jurisdiction over their overseas offices.
As a result, the likelihood of U.S. companies being subject to other nations’
jurisdictions would undermine the export of the U.S. products and under-
cut the foreign commercial interests of the United States.181  The U.S. gov-
ernment, including the judiciary could prevent such retaliation from
happening simply by limiting the unnecessary expansive jurisdiction of the
courts.
B. Deterrence to Cross-Border Transactions
For rules governing judicial jurisdiction, “predictability is valuable to
corporations making business and investment decisions.”182  The same
analysis in Gucci III might have been correct if BOC was the defendant in
the underlying lawsuit.  In that scenario, BOC as the alleged wrongdoer,
would have reasonably foreseen the potential litigation and could have
proactively structured its primary conduct by having some assurance as to
the places where it could be subject to liability.  Conversely, as a nonparty
to the underlying lawsuit, the nonparty has to deal with the litigation pas-
sively, given the nonparty’s difficulty in foreseeing the time and the reason
why it could be involved in a lawsuit.
As a 2007 report commissioned by Mayor Bloomberg and Senator
Schumer suggested, a key hindrance to U.S. competitiveness is “American’s
general propensity for litigation” and “the increasing extraterritorial reach
176. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11 (Eng.).
177. Id. §§ 1– 3.
178. Id. § 6.
179. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America & the
National Foreign Trade Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 17,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965) [hereinafter Brief of the
Chamber of Commerce & the National Foreign Trade Council et al.].
180. Brief of Economiesuisse & the Swiss Bankers Association et al., supra note 172.
181. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce & the National Foreign Trade Council et al.,
supra note 179.
182. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).
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of U.S. law.”183  Similarly, a Department of Commerce report tied con-
cerns about the U.S. legal system to foreign direct investment— ”[t]here is
an international perception that the pervasive nature of litigation in the
United States and other related aspects of the legal system increase the
costs of doing business and add uncertainty.”184
C. Potential Frustrations of the United States’ Efforts to Complete
Treaties
American courts’ expansive exercise of personal jurisdiction over for-
eign financial institutions impinges upon foreign nations’ sovereignty and
might frustrate the United States’ continued efforts to complete treaties
with other nations regarding the enforcement of judgments and related
issues.185  In its letter addressed to the Department of State, the Embassy
of the People’s Republic of China asserted that
[i]n recent years, the Chinese side has repeatedly expressed concerns over
the issue.  The two sides have had several discussions about it under the
framework of China– U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and
reached important consensus at the 5th S&ED: “Both sides commit to
improve cooperation on issues related to evidence taking, the provision of
notice to interested parties and enforcement of a U.S. restraint, seizure, or
forfeiture judgment or order in China involving financial institutions located
in China through the application of the relevant international agreements
and other bilateral, multilateral[,] or international cooperation mechanisms.
The Chinese side noticed that the channel of judicial assistance between the
two countries has been open, thus the U.S. side is fully capable of having
legitimate needs met through [a] legitimate channel.  The above-mentioned
measures against BOC, taken by the [U.S.] side unilaterally in spite of
China’s repeated objections, violates the consensus reached by the two sides
at S&ED.186
The U.S. government also observed that foreign governments’ objec-
tions to U.S. courts’ expansive views of personal jurisdiction have
“impeded negotiations of international agreements on the reciprocal recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments.”187  Such excessive assertion of judi-
cial jurisdiction “potentially threatens particular harm to the United States’
foreign trade and diplomatic interests.”188
183. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR N.Y. & U.S.S., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 73 (2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_
final.pdf.
184. CHARLES G. SCHOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: SUPPORTING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS BY REDUCING LEGAL COSTS
AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (Oct. 2008), http://trade.gov/investamerica/Litigation_FDI.pdf.
185. Brief of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. & the Ass’n of Global
Automakers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 35, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965).
186. Letter to Department of Justice at 1– 2, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ.
4974 (RJS), ECF No. 181.
187. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 33– 34,
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76).
188. Id. at 12.
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It is worth noting that under the proposed scheme, foreign banks
would not be completely immune from nonparty involvement.  The con-
cept of aiding and abetting will still support a court’s assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a foreign nonparty bank.  For instance, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania explicitly held that a Liberian nonparty “may be considered
an aider and abettor” to be properly before the court.189  Similarly, if the
underlying claims against defendants were criminal, the reasonableness’
balancing test under the proposed scheme would heavily weigh in favor of
asserting jurisdiction over the foreign nonparty bank.
Conclusion
Considering the increasing commercial interaction between the
United States and the rest of the world,190 litigation between states is rea-
sonably expected to increase.  Therefore, courts need clear guiding princi-
ples to successfully deal with the increasing number of commercial
litigations.  One solution could be that the U.S. government works together
with its trading partners or counterparties, to develop a bilateral or multi-
lateral judicial resolution, including issues on jurisdiction, discovery,
choice of law, and judgment enforcement.  Before such resolutions fully
develop, however, this Note provides a viable solution of the issues
presented in the Gucci cases— BOC’s in-forum activities meet the require-
ment of minimum contacts, nevertheless, traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice together with international comity require a court
to postpone exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign nonparty.
Therefore, a court should provide a foreign nonparty a chance to solve the
problem through a viable alternative: a request under the Hague Conven-
tion in the context of the Gucci cases, before resorting to the Federal Rules.
Such a resolution is ideal because on the one hand, a U.S. court will
still retain its power to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nonparties.  Such
reservation of power is like the sword of Damocles over the foreign nonpar-
ties so that they would have to satisfy plaintiff’s demands within a reasona-
ble time or be subject to U.S. courts’ sanctions.  On the other hand, a
foreign country would not compromise its sovereignty by satisfying plain-
tiffs’ request through a viable alternative.
189. See Abi Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., No. 91-6785,
2009 WL 80293, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2009), vacated and remanded on different
grounds, 391 Fed. Appx. 173 (3d Cir. 2010).
190. U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., THE BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, https://www
.uschamber.com/international/international-policy/benefits-international-trade-0.
